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Mr. and Mrs. Goebel submit this Reply Brief and Brief in Response to the 
Opening Brief of Cross-Appellant. 
The Goebels stand by their legal analysis, and its application to the instant 
dispute, that is set forth in their Opening Brief.l They seek to refrain from 
unnecessarily repeating the arguments, regarding the correctness of which they remain 
confident, that appear in that Brief. 
I. SOUTHERN HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY COUNTERED, BECAUSE 
IT CANNOT, THE GOEBELS5 CONTENTION THAT THEY ARE 
ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF THE DIRECTED VERDICT, THE 
GRANTING OF A NEW TRIAL, AND THE OTHER RELIEF THEY 
REQUEST. 
A. SOUTHERN'S STATEMENT OF FACTS CONTAINS 
SIGNIFICANT ERRORS AND POTENTIALLY MISLEADING 
STATEMENTS. 
The Goebels reply, as follows, to parts of Southern's Statement of Facts that 
may fairly, so that the Court may have an accurate picture, require reply. 
The Goebels5 counsel has noted certain errors that appear in the Goebels5 Opening 
Brief. First, the word "ambiguous,55 appearing in the first line of p. 5, was intended to 
be, and should be read as, "unambiguous.55 Also, the case of Lindsay v. Gibbons and 
Reed, 497 P.2d 28, 31 (Utah 1972), discussed at p. 29, was there miscited. Also, the 
word "reversible55 appearing in the middle of p. 39, should be read, to make more 
sense, as "prejudicial.55 Finally, as noted by the City at the first, unnumbered page and 
page 2 of its Brief, the pertinent sections of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act do, 
indeed, relate to Issue No. 6 addressed in the Goebels5 Opening Brief, rather than Issue 
No. 3. 
The Goebels' counsel apologizes to the Court and opposing counsel for any 
confusion or unnecessary effort that these errors, or any of them, may have caused. 
1 
1. First, it is not literally correct to say, as Southern has at p. 6 said, that 
"Mr. Goebel has no recollection of what actually caused his accident." He has a 
recollection of avoiding the protuberance (e.g., R. 6765, Tr. 674; R. 6767, Tr. 1139), 
by moving to the left, with that movement bringing him into line with the subject gap 
and without which movement there is no reason to think the incident would have 
occurred. 
2. The Goebels dispute the characterization, at p. 7, that the Administration 
and Coordination Agreement "demonstrated UTA's control over its railroad." There 
was no evidence presented at trial that UTA did anything, for purposes pertinent to this 
dispute, to "control" the railroad. The question has to do, in any event, with 
Southern's responsibilities with respect to the subject crossing and its immediate 
environs. And Southern owed the Goebels duties of care, as the District Court found 
(R. 6761, Tr. 4), pursuant to the Freight Easement (Ex. P-45; copy included in the 
Addendum hereto at 001-018), the Utah statutes, and the Salt Lake City ordinance. 
3. Southern's suggestion, at p. 7, that it had no right or obligation to do 
things not directly related to freight rail service is myopic and ignores other parts (e.g., 
section 3.3) of the Agreement (appended to the Goebels' Opening Brief at 043-76). 
Southern also fails to reckon with the fact that its own John Martinez (R. 6065-68; 
6171) in fact performed maintenance activities on other crossings along the line that is 
covered by the Agreement. Mr. Martinez testified that he was "responsible for 
2 
anything along that railroad track." R. 6065-68; 6185. He was, according to 
Southern's strained analysis, a trespasser when he was doing that work, and there was 
nothing surreptitious about what he was doing. Apart from duties under the Agree-
ment (and apart from duties under the pertinent statutes and ordinance), Southern 
assumed, as a matter of easement law, the duty to provide a reasonably safe surface 
for Mr. Goebel and other bicyclists who traveled over the crossings along the line. 
4. Southern gives Kathy Goebel too much credit when it says, at p. 10, that 
she "formulated a theory that on the date of the accident one particular space between 
two of the gauge panels was of such a precise width and depth that it barely 
accommodated the front tire of the bicycle." Mrs. Goebel's analysis was considerably 
less profound. That gap simply caught her eye and presented itself as the likely 
2
 Because Southern has not challenged the District Court's ruling that Southern owed 
the Goebels a duty of care pursuant to the Easement, Southern should not now be able 
to argue a lack of duty on that basis. The Goebels address this easement question for 
the Court's consideration if the Court decides, nonetheless, to examine it. In Salt Lake 
City Southern Railroad Company v. State Tax Commission, 987 P.2d 594 (Utah 
1999), this Court upheld a decision of the Utah State Tax Commission that the very 
Easement that is involved in this litigation is tangible property subject to taxation. The 
Goebels acknowledge that that dispute did not involve tort issues, but point out that the 
Court construed the Easement as something that 
gave [Southern] the exclusive right to make use of the land and trackage for 
freight railroad operations. Although the Easement, in the abstract, was non-
physical, it gave the company the right to use and occupy the physical property 
involved. 
Id. at 598 (emphasis added). Easement holders owe the public the duty of reasonable 
care. E.g., McDermott v. Metropolitan Sanitary District, 607 N.E.2d 1271, 1285 (111. 
App. 1992); Levy v. Kimball 443 P.2d 142, 148 (Haw. 1968). 
3 
culprit. R. 6767, Tr. 1141. None of her initial impressions as to precisely what 
occurred, and none of the Goebels5 counsel's initial impressions, are of any particular 
significance. What is of particular significance is the analysis of David Ingebretsen, 
the Goebels' accident reconstruction and causation expert. The Goebels commend the 
entirety of his testimony (R. 6765, Tr. 752 to R. 6766, Tr. 982; R. 6767, Tr. 1100-06) 
to the Court's thorough consideration. Mr. Ingebretsen's accident causation analysis 
was buttressed by the testimony of Dave Roberts, the eyewitness, whom the Goebels 
did not discover until years after the incident occurred. The Goebels likewise 
commend to the Court's thorough consideration the entirety of the testimony of 
Mr. Roberts (R. 6762, Tr. 132-65). 
5. The fact that Southern's accident reconstruction expert offered an 
opinion on accident causation that differs from Mr. Ingebretsen's opinion is of no 
outcome-determinative significance. Mr. Ingebretsen gave testimony (e.g., R. 6766, 
Tr. 851-64; 874; 977-80) that convincingly ruled out any alternative scenarios, 
including the non-credible and speculative ones pushed by Southern. 
6. It is misleading for Southern to state, as it does at pp. 11 and 12, that 
"the only precise measurements taken of the gap between panels 1 and 8 while the 
crossing was still in place demonstrated that it was not wide enough to accommodate 
Mr. Goebel's rim let alone the tires." Jeff Ertel, the Goebels' investigator, on 
March 22, 1998 measured that gap as being % of an inch wide (R. 6762, Tr. 179-80; 
4 
Ex. P-13). The fact that Mr. Ertel used a tape measure rather than the measuring 
instrument used by David Stephens does not render Mr. Ertel's measurements 
"imprecise." Three quarters of an inch was wide enough for the wheel to be driven 
into the gap (R. 6765, Tr. 805-06). All witnesses who were asked the question 
acknowledged that material, including the rubber pads at the crossing, contracts in cold 
weather and expands in hot weather (e.g., R.6765, Tr. 801-04; R. 6762, Tr. 116; R. 
6065-70; 6087; 6207-08). As the rubber pads expand, the gaps between them will, of 
course, become less wide. The incident happened in wintertime, on February 19th. 
Mr. Stephens made his measurements at the end of July (R. 6767, Tr. 1175, 1185), the 
hottest time of the year. An example of the difference in size between March (when 
•I 
Mr. Ertel made his measurements) and the July measurements made by Mr. Stephens 
can be seen by comparing Ex. P-13 (Mr. Ertel's measurements - see, particularly, the 
15/16 inch measurement he made of the gap that Mrs. Goebel thought was the one) 
with the .774 measurement of that gap made by Mr. Stephens in July. R. 6767, Tr. 
1186. 
7. Another misleading thing in Southern's Brief is its reference, at p. 12, to 
the July debris-filled gap. See Ex. P-8 (smaller copy included in the Addendum 
hereto, at 019), the lower left corner of which shows the condition of the gap in 
3
 It was warmer on March 22n , the date of the measurements, than it was on the date of 
the incident. See Ex. P-50 and P-51. 
5 
question at the time, two or three days after the incident, that that photo was taken. 
Mrs. Goebel did not dig any debris out; and there was no debris in the gap near the 
surface of the crossing. R. 6767, Tr. 1152-53. See, also, the Ertel videotape (Ex. P-
12), made March 14, 1998 (a CD ROM copy of that videotape is included in the 
Addendum hereto, at 020). 
8. There is no support for the suggestion, in footnote 1 (p. 12), that 
Mr. Goebel hit the protuberance. That is, like Southern's suggestion that Mr. Goebel 
hit a phantom object sitting on the tracks, utter speculation and unsupported by the 
evidence. It is directly at odds with the testimony of Mr. Goebel (R. 6765, Tr. 674), 
and it is (given the location of the protuberance) at odds with the testimony of 
eyewitness Dave Roberts (R. 6762, Tr. 149). And Southern's theory of Mr. Goebel's 
having gone off the roadway and hitting an exposed rail was shown to be not worthy 
of belief. See the testimony of Mr. Goebel (R. 6765, Tr. 662-63; 702), Mr. Roberts (R. 
6762, Tr. 165), Jeffrey Clark, a paramedic (R. 6763, Tr. 227), Mr. Ingebretsen (R. 
6766, Tr. 852-57; 978-80), and, when understood, Dr. Woolley (Southern's expert) 
himself (R. 6767, Tr. 1083-91). 
9. Southern goes to considerable length, at pp. 13-22, in its attempt to 
convince the Court that, because no one had pre-accident actual knowledge of the 
specific gap involved in the incident, and because people did not identify that specific 
gap as the one involved in the incident until years after the incident (when 
6 
Mr. Ingebretsen's accident reconstruction work was being done), Southern should not 
be held to have had constructive notice. That analysis may have superficial appeal, but 
its validity disappears under careful scrutiny. First, and with respect to Mr. Martinez 
and Mr. Perry, the record is abundantly clear that neither of those men ever concerned 
himself with the safety of bicyclists or with gaps of this nature. E.g., R.6065-68; 6167; 
6194; R. 6767, Tr. 1168-70. If someone does not concern himself with a particular 
thing, how can he be expected to take note of that thing? Next, the fact that Mr. Alires 
did not notice such a gap is of no particular probative significance. There is no 
indication of when he had last been anywhere near the scene prior to the time of the 
incident or that he was looking for this kind of hazard. The same applies to 
Mr. Aguilar and to Mr. Mecham, who, as noted by Southern, never had gaps at 
crossings as a problem for bicyclists even cross his mind. Mr. Mumford's report that 
the subject crossing was in "good condition" in 1993, when his report was likely done 
(R. 6765, Tr. 612), is of no probative value. It is too remote in time, and there is no 
indication that he was thinking of gaps in crossings that might jeopardize the safety of 
bicycle riders. 
Nor is there any indication that Jeffrey Clark, the paramedic, or Daniel 
Miller, the Union Pacific man, ever actually looked for gaps in the subject crossing. It 
may be of interest that, as pointed out by Southern, Mr. Miller did not (even after 
hearing about the incident) think there was anything potentially dangerous even about 
7 
the gap in which at least two of Mrs. Goebel's fingers are placed, a gap which 
measured 15/16" a few weeks later, a gap by all accounts wide enough to 
accommodate Mr. Goebel's bicycle tire and to cause a catastrophic injury to occur. 
Mr. Miller's approach to bicycle safety may be an example of the rule, set forth in 
MUJI 3.10, to the effect that even an entire industry may be negligent. It is also unfair 
for Southern to ask the Court to accord any importance to Ex. D-l, inasmuch as that 
photograph was, as explained hereinabove, taken in the middle of the summer when 
the subject gap had, according to the essence of all testimony on this subject, narrowed 
from the time of the incident. 
Southern's Mr. Jackson went to the scene in hot weather. It is not 
surprising that he could find no gap which would have posed a hazard to a bicyclist. It 
is also of interest that the testimony of Mr. Jackson, like that of his company's 
employee, Mr. Martinez, supports the proposition that Southern did not actively 
concern itself with the safety of bicyclists or with gaps that could endanger bicyclists. 
E.g., R. 6765, Tr. 620-22. 
When Mr. Ertel, the Goebels' investigator, went to the scene, he, like 
Mrs. Goebel, and like the Goebels' counsel prior to the time the accident 
reconstruction was done, focused on the larger gap. That simply appeared to be the 
likeliest candidate before Mr. Ingebretsen's analysis was done. Also, Mr. Ertel 
testified (R. 6762, Tr. 180-81) that he was of the impression that that gap, like the 
8 
larger gap, did not have much debris in it and appeared to be wide enough to 
accommodate a bicycle wheel.4 
The Goebels, through their counsel mindful of alternative MUJI 
instruction 8.8 (quoted at p. 24 of the Goebels' Opening Brief), called Chuck Collins 
for the purpose, among others, of explaining that 1700 South is a commonly used 
bicycle route. The fact that he did not notice any gap at the crossing that he thought 
might be a hazard to bicyclists is overplayed by Southern. First, there is no evidence 
as to the last time prior to the incident that Mr. Collins rode over that crossing. It is 
also significant that Mr. Collins explained that, while riding a bicycle at 20 m.p.h. (the 
top end of Mr. Goebel's approximate speed), he would typically be looking 30-40 feet 
ahead (R. 6763, Tr. 377). There is no evidence that he or Mr. Goebel or any other 
bicyclist stopped at the crossing to inspect it for gaps. They, unlike Southern, had no 
duty to inspect. At the speed at which Mr. Goebel (and, presumably, Mr. Collins) rode 
(15-20 mph or 22-30 feet per second; R. 6766, Tr. 825-26), a bicyclist traverses the 
crossing very quickly and, given other things (vehicular traffic and other crossing 
hazards) with which bicyclists must deal, and the lack of color contrast between the 
4
 In reply to footnote 2 of Southern's Brief, the Goebels note that they certainly did not 
intend to distort anything with respect to the "freeze frame" or "videograb." Ex. P-10 
came into evidence without objection. The Court is, in any event, encouraged to 
review the actual videotape, which also clearly shows the subject gap. Perhaps more 
importantly, Southern's continuing to stress its Ex. D-l, an enlargement of a photo 
taken in July, is an example of the weakness of Southern's position in this Appeal. 
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black rubber pads and the gap, it is not surprising that Mr. Collins did not notice 
whatever gaps, relatively small but large enough to swallow a bicycle tire, may have 
existed during his own trips across the crossing. Also, Mr. Collins explained (R. 6763, 
Tr. 362) that, once he generally acquainted himself with the crossing, he did not pay 
particular heed to what was happening with gaps. He simply stayed away from the 
seams between the pads. 
Southern attempts to make much of the fact that no one who testified in 
this case had ever heard of an incident, other than the subject incident, in which a bike 
rider's wheel had gone into a gap between crossing pads. The fact that a particular 
kind of incident had not, within the knowledge of testifying witnesses, happened 
before, is not of outcome-determinative significance. At least two witnesses who 
testified (R. 6065-68; 6198-99; 6211) acknowledged the adage that there is a first time 
for everything. Also, it may be of interest that Mr. Collins testified regarding 
analogous hazards (drainage grates - of the kind that appears in the gutter near the 
beginning of the Ertel videotape - and gaps between cattle crossing guards on 
highways). R. 6763, Tr. 355-56. See, also, the discussion at 35, below. 
Southern misses the mark in its heavy reliance on Mr. Goebel's not 
noticing the gap before the incident occurred.5 First, like Mr. Collins, he had no 
5
 If Mr. Goebel had had knowledge of the dangerous subject gap, Southern would 
almost certainly be arguing that the Goebels are barred from recovering by reason of 
10 
responsibility to inspect the crossing for safety. Like Mr. Collins, he rode looking 
ahead 30-40 feet. R. 6765, Tr. 674. His observation experience while riding, like that 
of Mr. Collins, was affected by other things he had to deal with in the riding 
environment and also the lack of contrast between the black pads and the gaps. Some 
parts of the videotape taken by Mr. Ertel and of a photo (Ex. P-14; smaller copy 
included in the Addendum hereto, at 021) Mr. Ertel took on March 22, 1998 are 
illustrative of that lack of contrast. The gaps that Mr. Goebel never noticed include the 
large gap in the photograph in which Mrs. Goebel's fingers appear (Ex. P-l 1, 
appearing under Tab 10 in the Addendum to Southern's Brief). As with the subject 
gap, there is no reason to think that that gap, which was photographed within a few 
days (R. 6767, Tr. 1139-40; 1151-52) of the incident, progressed to dangerous size, 
after the pads had been in place for more than four years, only in such a short interim. 
the "open and obvious danger" rule, most recently discussed in Hale v. Beckstead, 
2003 UT App. 240. 
Also, the Court may find instructive the following discussion from Keitel v. St. 
Louis C & W R. Co.. 28 Mo. App. 657, 664 (Mo. App. 1888): 
The law does not, in general, drive a party to the doing of an impossible thing. 
This defect was not a defect so visible and apparent to ordinary travelers on the 
street as to become the subject of observation. It was rather in the nature of a 
latent or obscure defect, which would, in general, not be discovered, except by 
such an inspection as it was incumbent upon the defendant to make and to 
maintain. From the nature of the case, it would, therefore, be in most cases 
impossible for a traveler, injured as the plaintiff was, to prove at what time the 
defendant became aware of the defect, or at what time the defect itself 
commenced. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The Court may also wish to take note of other gaps that appear in the Ertel videotape 
and in Ex. P-8. 
Southern misstates the District Court's reasoning when it states, in the 
last sentence of its "Statement of Facts," appearing at the top of page 22: "It was this 
total lack of any notice of a potential hazard or even proof that a hazard existed that 
persuaded the trial court to grant a directed verdict." (Emphasis added.) The District 
Court explained, as is set forth in footnote 11 (p. 41) of the Goebels' Opening Brief, 
that "the gap was the proximate cause of the accident." At least to the District Court's 
satisfaction, Mr. Ingebretsen's opinion of accident causation was the one that made 
sense and the District Court appears indeed to have been persuaded that "a hazard 
existed." 
B. PROOF OF ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE IS NOT 
REQUIRED WITH RESPECT TO ANY OF THE GOEBELS9 
CLAIMS OTHER THAN THEIR NON-"PERMANENT 
CONDITION" COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CLAIM, AND 
THEY PRESENTED SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE EVEN ON 
THAT CLAIM. 
The Goebels reply to Southern's contentions in the order in which those 
contentions are set forth in Southern's Brief.6 
6
 The Goebels concur with Southern that the appropriate way to analyze Mrs. Goebel's 
loss of consortium claim is that it will sink or swim with Mr. Goebel's claims on the 
various issues to be decided by the Court. 
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1. THE PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIM 
Notice was not even mentioned in Erickson v. Sorensen, 877 P.2d 144 (Utah 
App. 1994), or, with two exceptions, in any other public nuisance cases that have come 
to the attention of the Goebels' counsel. In both of those cases it was held that the 
plaintiff need not prove notice. One of those cases is Keitel v. St. Louis C. & W. R. 
Co., 28 Mo. App. 657, 663 (Mo. App. 1888). The other one is Wabash R. Co. v. 
DeHart 65 N.E. 192, 194-95 (Ind. App. 1902), a case that the Goebels especially 
commend to the Court's consideration. That "gradual decay" case discusses many 
concepts involved in this appeal, including negligence "in the nature of a public 
nuisance," the importance of a railroad company's "high degree of active vigilance," 
the lack of a notice requirement, the public policy behind that rule of law, a railroad's 
neglect of its duty, and prima facie showing of negligence by violation of a safety 
statute. 
As acknowledged by Southern, R. 860, common law negligence is something 
different from non-strict liability public nuisance "negligence." Public nuisance law 
appears to deal with degrees of unreasonable conduct. An entity responsible for the 
safety of the public can, by its acts or omissions, be "negligent" even if its 
"unreasonableness" is not so severe that it can be said to have acted "intentionally" or 
"recklessly" or to have created something "ultra-hazardous." The essence of 
"negligence," for public nuisance purposes, appears to be the same as it is in typical 
13 
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non-premises liability negligence cases. See the "negligence" instruction agreed to by 
the parties. R. 5900. See, also, Utah Code Ann. §76-10-803, and the "public 
nuisance" instruction agreed to by the parties. R. 5904. See, also, the instruction (R. 
5941) submitted by the Goebels regarding Southern's "railroad" duty of care (modeled 
after MUJI 8.8), and see the alternative "railroad" instruction set forth at MUJI 8.7. 
The test proposed by the Goebels is not, contrary to Southern's suggestion, one 
of "lack of concern." It is whether, in all the circumstances, and as a matter for jury 
determination, Southern created or maintained a public nuisance, and whether 
Southern acted or omitted to act in a manner that was unreasonable in the 
circumstances. That Southern did not concern itself with the safety of bicyclists is one 
of the factors that the jury should have been allowed to consider in determining 
whether Southern acted unreasonably. 
2. THE "PERMANENT NATURE" OF THE HAZARD 
As explained in the Goebels' Opening Brief, the Court should determine that 
the nature of the condition in question was "permanent" and, accordingly, that the 
Goebels were and are not required to put on proof of Southern's actual or constructive 
knowledge of the condition. Contrary to Southern's argument, the Goebels do not 
contend that "all gaps, even razor thin gaps" need to be removed. The idea is that, 
7
 A fundamental problem with the District Court's analysis, and with Southern's 
argument, is that both the District Court and Southern seem erroneously to view this, 
from a notice perspective, as nothing other than a traditional premises liability case. 
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because of the very nature of the materials and crossing structure, there is a tendency 
for gaps to continue to widen, subject to the seasonal expansion-and-contraction 
phenomenon discussed above, and subject to the concept (e.g., R. 6065-70; 6094; 
6117) that they do not continue to widen indefinitely. Once these things are 
understood, there is no reason to treat this any differently from any other "permanent" 
condition. All the imposition of such a duty on Southern in this case would require 
Southern to do is to monitor the condition of the panels and, when any of the gaps 
approach crucial size, to take reasonable and appropriate safety-oriented action. 
Contrary to Southern's characterization, Gilton v. Hestonville M. & F. P. R. Co., 31 
Atl. 249 (Pa. 1895) stands, for purposes pertinent to this discussion, for that very 
proposition. So does the Wabash v. DeHart case discussed above, at 13. See, also. 
Smith v. Morrow, 220 111. App. 627, 630 (111. App. 1921). 
This Court, in a case relied on by Southern and the District Court, Fishbaugh v. 
Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403 (Utah 1998), made an observation that is 
instructive on the question of whether the gap-widening phenomenon constituted a 
"permanent condition." In that case, which dealt with a malfunctioning street light 
which had allegedly not been promptly fixed (like produce on a supermarket floor, and 
unlike gaps between crossing panels, a transitory condition), this Court referred to a 
putative, conceptually different situation "where a light post is neglected to such a 
degree that the structure itself creates a hazard." 969 P.2d at 407. This is a situation 
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where, at least as a matter of triable fact, Southern "neglected" the condition of the 
crossing to such a degree that the crossing "itself create[d] a hazard." And this seems 
to be a significantly stronger case for application of the "permanent" condition rule 
than was the situation in Carlile v. Wal-Mart, 61 P.3d 287 (Utah 2002), where the 
Utah Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment in a situation where the 
"permanent condition" was alleged to be the use of an electric cart in a store. The 
questions of fact recognized to be pertinent to the inquiry in Carlile were whether the 
use of electric carts presented a foreseeable danger and whether the defendant took 
reasonable safety precautions to prevent injuries. Id. at 290. Here it has been 
established that there was a foreseeable danger (e.g., R. 6065-70; 6104-05; R. 6765, 
Tr. 623) and that Southern did not even inspect the crossings for the safety of 
bicyclists and did not even concern itself with bicyclists' safety. R. 6065-68; 6167; 
6178; 6194. The condition here was a "permanent condition"; Southern is, by reason 
thereof, deemed to have known of the condition; and no further showing of notice is 
necessary. Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 476 (Utah 1996). 
3. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE 
Southern contends that the Goebels did not present evidence from which a jury 
could reasonably infer that Southern had constructive knowledge (that is, that Southern 
should have noticed the problem) and an opportunity to cure the problem. Southern 
does not want to deal with the fact that the crossing had been in place for over four 
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years and that there is no evidence that any agency other than normal wear and tear 
and climatic influences caused the gap to get into its dangerous condition. Nor does 
Southern want to deal with the fact that Mr. Martinez was at the scene two days before 
the incident and that he then had the opportunity, had he cared about the safety of 
bicyclists, to take note of what was, at least as a matter of reasonable inference, by 
then a hazardous condition. With respect to the question of reasonable opportunity to 
cure, this Court has held, in essence, that as little time as 18 minutes between notice of 
a dangerous condition and the time an incident occurs provides, as a question of triable 
fact, sufficient opportunity to cure. Bowen v. Riverton City,8 656 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 
1982). There is no reason to think, given the nature of how gaps progress to critically 
dangerous sizes, that the subject gap had been in its dangerous condition for less than 
18 minutes prior to the incident. At least as a matter of triable fact, Southern had not 
only constructive notice of the problem, but also a reasonable opportunity to remedy it. 
Contrary to Southern's protestation, the fact that Mr. Goebel and Mr. Collins 
did not notice a hazard is not "extremely significant," especially when one understands 
the dynamics of what bicycle riders are and are not, as suggested above, at 9-10, 
expected to see. Nor does the fact that gaps "can form quickly" assist Southern. There 
is no evidence in this case that the subject gap did "form quickly," and the scrape 
8
 Bowen is also significant for the Court's comment that "[reasonable persons might 
differ as to whether the annual inspections conducted by Riverton City were sufficient 
under the circumstances." Id. Southern never inspected for bicycle safety. 
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marks that appear on the pads that appear in the exhibits referenced at p. 30 of 
Southern's Brief have nothing to do with the gap Mr. Ingebretsen testified was the 
incident gap. The large gap depicted at Ex. P-11 (the one with Mrs. Goebel's fingers 
in it) was between panels with scrape marks, but the only evidence on the subject was 
that that damage was "purely cosmetic" (R. 6065-68; 6213). 
4. THE ABIDING SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
PROTUBERANCE 
Southern understandably, from an adversarial perspective, relegates discussion 
of the "protuberance" to subordinate status. It does so out of its recognition that, as 
explained in the Goebels5 Opening Brief at 19, there is not even a question of notice 
regarding that aspect of the Goebels5 case. But for the presence of the protuberance, 
there is no reason to think that Mr. Goebel would have had reason to move to the left 
of the fog line and encounter the gap. E.g., R. 6765, Tr. 660-66; 674; 697-700; Ex. P-
54. Southern's suggestion that the protuberance had nothing more to do with the 
accident than Mr. Goebel's choice to ride a bicycle on the morning of the incident 
misses the mark. Consider not only the analogy discussed in the Goebels' Opening 
Brief at 20-21, and countless other ones that can reasonably be posited, but also the 
observation of this Court in an analogous fact situation, in Braithwaite v. West Valley 
City Corp., 860 P.2d 336, 338-39 (Utah 1993): 
If, as plaintiffs assert, their child was killed because he was forced out into the 
traffic lane due to a parked car and an encroaching fence, a material question of 
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fact arises whether the City has discharged its obligation to provide reasonably 
safe conditions for pedestrian travel. 
The presence of the protuberance and Salt Lake Southern's negligence, with 
clear constructive notice of it and opportunity to cure it, constituted, at least as a 
question fit for jury determination, the requisite proximate cause connection. This has 
significance not only with respect to the "2-foot rule" referenced in Utah Code Ann. 
§§10-7-26(2) and -29 and the Salt Lake City ordinance, but also with respect to the 
common law principle that an entity charged with the safety of railroad crossings has a 
duty to keep the approaches to crossings, as well as the crossings themselves, in a 
reasonably safe condition. E.g., Bullock v. Yakima Valley Transp. Co., 184 P. 641, 
648 (Wash. 1919); Wichita V. R. Co. v. Meyers. 248 S.W. 444, 446 (Tex. App. 1922); 
Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Woods. 262 S.W. 229, 232 (Tex. App. 1924); Cincinnati H. 
& I. R. Co. v. Claire, 33 N.E. 918, 920 (Ind. App. 1893). The Court should rule that 
the District Court committed reversible error in determining, as a matter of law, that 
there was no proximate cause connection between the protuberance and Mr. Goebel's 
injuries. 
5. THE STATUTES AND THE ORDINANCE 
It is well established, contrary to Southern's argument, that notice need not be 
proved in situations in which the obligation of a railway or railroad company has been 
affirmatively addressed by statute or ordinance. The parts of Utah Code Ann. §§10-7-
19 
26 and 10-7-29, and Salt Lake City ordinance 14.44.0309 relied on by the Goebels are 
those kinds of positive law. Contrary to Southern's argument, those laws do not apply 
only to dealings with the City and do not become triggered only in cases in which the 
City directs the railroad or railway company to do something. They impose on railway 
companies a duty to make and keep crossings and their immediate environs reasonably 
safe. The fact that they do not expressly dispense with a notice requirement and the 
fact that they do not expressly deal with gaps is of no particular significance. 
Southern misses the point when it contends, at p. 34, that "Sections 56-1-1110 
and 10-7-29 also do not impose strict liability on railroads." The Goebels do not 
contend that any of the subject Utah statutes or the Salt Lake City ordinance imposes 
"strict liability." The essence of the Goebels' contentions regarding those laws is that 
their existence and applicability to railroad and railway companies, such as Salt Lake 
9
 The pertinent language of these statutes and Part A of that ordinance are set forth at 
001-02 of the Goebels' Opening Brief. That ordinance, like those statutes, 
incorporates the "2-foot rule" pertinent to the protuberance. Part B of that ordinance 
provides, in pertinent part: 
The portions of the street or alley surfaces to be so maintained by all such 
railway companies shall include all the space between the different rails and 
tracks and also the space outside the outer rail of each outside track for a 
distance of two feet (2'), measured from the outside edge of the rail.... 
10
 The District Court long before trial ruled (R. 364), at Southern's instance, that a 
claim under that statute would be "superfluous and would add nothing to plaintiffs' 
claims," and the Goebels thereafter, honoring the District Court's ruling, refrained 
from pursuing, in the District Court proceedings, claims founded only on that statute. 
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City Southern Railroad Company, Inc., dispense with the notice requirement that is a 
part of purely common law, non-"permanent condition" premises liability law. That is 
the essence of what the York, Moreland, and Red cases cited by the Goebels in their 
Opening Brief at 23 stand for. That principle has been accepted in numerous other 
cases as well. See, e.g., Glasemann v. Erie R. Co., 130 A. 445, 446 (N.J. 1925); Raper 
v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 36 S.E. 115, 115-16 (N.C. 1900); Worster v. The Forty-
Second St. and G.S.F.R. Co., 50 N.Y. 203, 205 (N.Y. 1872); Keitel v. St. Louis C. & 
W.R. Co., 28 Mo. App. 657, 664 (Mo. App. 1888). Those cases all recognize that 
violation of such statutes (which statutes - like the laws here at issue — do not 
expressly dispense with the notice requirement) is, even absent a showing of actual or 
constructive notice, enough to make out & prima facie case and to carry a case to a 
jury. And some {e.g., Raper, 36 S.E. at 116) give good policy explanations for why 
that is so. The idea appears to be that railroads interfere with public ways, and that 
railroad companies have duties, because of that dynamic, that go beyond those of other 
categories of land occupiers. It would certainly be contrary to public safety if this 
Court should rule that, as a matter of law, a railroad company such as Southern can 
turn a blind eye to the safety of bicyclists and then escape liability because it failed to 
notice and remedy a dangerous condition. 
The York case, among others dealing with similar statutes, is instructive with 
respect to the Goebels' contention that the District Court erred in refusing to allow 
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them to pursue a claim under Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11. That statute, again, provides: 
Every railroad company shall be liable for damages caused by its neglect to 
make and maintain good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of 
travel crosses its road. 
The York court explained: 
Section 8914 of the [Ohio] general code, provides in substance, that a railroad 
company shall maintain at every point where a public road, street, lane or 
highway used by the public crosses its railroad, safe and sufficient crossings 
and such company shall be liable for all damages sustained in person or 
property by reason of the want or sufficiency of such crossing, or neglect or 
carelessness in the construction thereof, or in keeping them in repair. 
In light of that statutory language, quite similar to that of §56-1-11, and similar 
in concept to that of the other pertinent Utah statutes and the Salt Lake City ordinance, 
the York court determined that notice was not an additional element of a claim. What 
needs to be proved under 56-1-11 is what is set forth in the statute and what appeared 
in the jury instruction approved in Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R. Co., 186 P.2d 293, 
306 (Utah 1947) (set forth at p. 36 of the Goebels' Opening Brief). As the Court will 
see, there is no discussion of notice in that instruction, and it is certainly not a "strict 
liability" instruction. 
The Court should take note of the following language from Louisville, N. A. & 
C. R. Co. v. Red, 47 111. App. 662, 664-65 (111. App. 1892): 
Railroad companies may be presumed to know the condition of the crossings 
over which they run their trains, and if they see fit to operate them in cities at 
places where the statutory obligation to have the public right of way safe, has 
been neglected, they must, at the least, be held bound to exercise such diligence 
as the safety of persons at the unsafe public way demands. 
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This principle, laid down more than a century ago, is not at odds with Utah law 
and still makes sense. n Railroad companies' conducting operations in a manner (by 
11 did or omission) that potentially jeopardizes the safety of the public is a matter of 
significant public interest. Statutory and case law, from both Utah and elsewhere, has 
developed in recognition of the proposition that railroads are obliged to take 
affirmative action to keep their crossings reasonably safe for the public. 
No reported Utah case appears directly to hold that a showing of notice is not 
required in railroad crossing cases, but it is firmly established Utah law that violation 
of a safety law (statute or ordinance) is prima facie evidence of negligence. E.g., 
Adkins v. Uncle Bart's, Inc., 1 P.3d 528, 533 (Utah 2000); Ryan v. Gold Cross Serv., 
Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995); Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 432 (Utah 1998); 
Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 850-51 (Utah 1981); Gaw v. State of Utah, 798 P.2d 
1130, 1135 (Utah App. 1990). The Goebels submitted a proposed jury instruction (R. 
5953) setting forth that proposition. It is elementary trial procedure law that "a 
defense motion for a directed verdict must be denied if the plaintiff has made out a 
prima facie case." 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial §984. The Goebels made out prima facie 
11
 See the proposed jury instruction (R. 5960) submitted by the Goebels and the 
mention of it (R. 6760, Tr. 33) in the context of Southern's motion for directed verdict. 
12
 See the quotation from Oswald v. Utah L. & R. Co., 117 P. 46, 47 (Utah 1911), set 
forth in the Goebels5 Opening Brief, at 23, and not responded to by Southern in its 
Brief. 
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claims under Sections 10-7-26 and 10-7-29 and the Salt Lake City ordinance (and, 
although the District Court's pre-trial ruling prohibited them from pursuing a 
1 ^ 
negligence-like claim founded on §56-1-11 and Southern's "neglect," under that 
statute as well). Those laws do not require notice to be established, and it was error 
for the District Court to engraft such a requirement onto them. 
"It is the declared policy of this court to zealously protect the right of trial by 
jury and not to take issues from them and rule as a matter of law except in clear cases." 
Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 342 P.2d 1094, 1101 (Utah 1959). The 
Goebels trust the Court will recognize, in the exercise of that zealous protection, that 
this is not one of those rare cases. 
C THE DISTRICT COURT'S EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OF 
TESTING DONE BY MR. INGEBRETSEN WAS AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION. 
The Goebels are not, contrary to Southern's characterization, asking this Court 
to "make its own evidentiary ruling," with respect to the District Court's exclusion of 
evidence pertaining to empirical testing done by Mr. Ingebretsen. The Goebels are 
13
 Here is another definition of "neglect," from Black's Law Dictionary (7 ed. 1999): 
The omission of proper attention to a person or thing, whether inadvertent, 
negligent, or willful; the act or condition of disregarding. 
As explained in the Goebels' Opening Brief, at 27, 34, Southern's conduct seems to 
qualify as "neglect," as, at a bare minimum, a question of triable fact. Southern's 
analysis of neglect, set forth at p. 34 of its Brief, has it backwards. The point is that 
Southern cannot be expected ever to have had actual notice of something it 
disregarded, or "neglected." 
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urging the Court to recognize that there was no chance of a reasonably intelligent 
jury's being misled or confused, and that the District Court's subject evidentiary ruling 
was indeed so unreasonable that it should be classified as arbitrary and capricious or a 
clear abuse of discretion. As explained in the Goebels' Opening Brief, and as seen in 
the cross-examination of Dr. Woolley (R. 6766, Tr. 1041-45; R. 6767, Tr. 1059-62), 
that witness's experiment was dissimilar in numerous ways from the particulars of the 
subject incident. Yet the District Court allowed evidence of it and presumably will do 
so again in the new trial. In all the circumstances, it was unfair and an abuse of 
discretion for the District Court to disallow the Goebels' desired evidence from being 
presented to the jury; and it would be unfair, on retrial, for that to occur again. 
D SOUTHERN OWED THE GOEBELS A DUTY, PURSUANT TO 
§324A OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, AND 
THE GOEBELS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PRESENT 
EVIDENCE OF HOW SOUTHERN AND UTA CONSTRUED AND 
APPLIED THEIR AGREEMENT. 
To understand the Administration and Coordination Agreement the Court needs 
to consider it in its entirety, including its recitals (set forth at 043-44 of the Addendum 
to the Goebels5 Opening Brief). The Court also needs to understand that, at the time of 
the incident, the "trackage" was "joint trackage" (id. at 045), inasmuch as there had 
been no "reassignment" under section 2.3 (id. at 049-50), and no reason, because UTA 
was not yet operating, to segregate the line between "freight" and "passenger" 
trackage. Section 3.3 (id. at 051), which deals with "joint trackage," appears to be the 
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language that directly addresses the situation in effect through the time of the incident. 
It says nothing of the putative duty of UTA and deals only with the duty of Southern. 
It concludes with the following: 
Nothing herein shall relieve [Southern] of the obligation to perform 
maintenance, repair and renewal on the Joint Trackage in a good and workman-
like manner and in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. 
Contrary to Southern's contention, §324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
establishes a duty running from Southern to the Goebels. The most pertinent provision 
of that Restatement section is the following: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to 
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third 
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm 
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, 
if 
(b) He has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person. 
For UTA originally had a duty, as the landowner, or lessee, that ran to the 
public, including the Goebels. Then, pursuant to the Agreement, Southern 
"[undertook] to perform" UTA's duty to make and keep the crossing reasonably safe. 
Southern's Mr. Martinez did maintenance work, not directly related to the movement 
of freight, at other crossings along the same line (see, e.g., R. 6065-68; 6184-89); and 
Southern's contention that it did not specifically undertake to eliminate unsafe gaps, 
like its contention that the pertinent statutes and ordinance do not specifically make 
illegal railway companies' failure to eliminate unsafe gaps, is cutting too fine a slice of 
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bologna. Also, it would be a remarkable conclusion if Southern had the right to 
perform operations and yet had no corresponding responsibility to the users of public 
roadways that crossed the tracks on which Southern was operating and from which 
operations Southern was presumably profiting. Finally, the Court may find instructive 
Conrad v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 542 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1975). There, in reversing 
a summary judgment, it held, in a situation where a plaintiff bicycle rider sustained 
injuries when he encountered a hole in land that the defendant bank did not own but on 
which it did work, explained: 
The court apparently assumed that the Bank owed no duty to the plaintiff, since 
it did not own the land wherein lay the hole. This is a false assumption. By 
utilizing the area between the street and sidewalk and by undertaking to keep it 
level, the Bank became charged with a duty to do so in a nonnegligent manner, 
the same as if it had owned the land. 
Id. 
The Court should determine either that Southern owed the Goebels a duty of 
care under the Agreement or that the Agreement was ambiguous, and the Goebels 
should be allowed to present their desired evidence. 
11. SOUTHERN SHOULD NOT PREVAIL ON ANY OF ITS CROSS-
APPEAL CONTENTIONS. 
A, THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
SOUTHERN OWED THE GOEBELS DUTIES OF CARE 
PURSUANT TO THE UTAH STATUTES AND THE SALT I \ ICE 
CITY ORDINANCE. 
Southern makes the argument, remarkable by reason of Southern's name and 
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the operations it was conducting, that it is not a "railway" and not a "railroad" within 
the purview of the pertinent Utah statutes and the pertinent Salt Lake City ordinance. 
First, the thrust of the statutory and ordinance language (set forth at pages 001 and 002 
of the Addendum to the Goebels' Opening Brief) makes it clear that the intent of those 
positive laws is that a railroad company operating over tracks, especially when it has 
long been the only one so operating and when it has had the only practical opportunity 
to maintain and keep safe crossings and their immediate environs, owes duties of care 
to the public. That is precisely the situation here, inasmuch as UTA had never actually 
operated this or any other railroad. See, generally, the testimony of UTA5 s Crosby 
Mecham (R. 6764, Tr. 567-79; R. 6765, Tr. 600-614), and see the proffers with respect 
to Mr. Mecham's testimony (R. 6765, Tr. 587-94; 598-99). See, also, the testimony of 
Mr. Martinez with respect to his inspection and maintenance obligation and work (R. 
6065-68; 6184-89). See also the exhibits, not received in evidence, but proffered (R. 
6767, Tr. 1149) by the Goebels (proposed Exs. P-75 and P-76), pertaining to the 
communications between Southern and UTA regarding maintenance along the line. 
The subject statutes and ordinance exist for the protection of the public. The 
public could receive no protection from an entity such as UTA that, as a practical 
matter and pursuant to the Agreement, was doing nothing on the land. Given those 
considerations and the evidence that Mr. Martinez was doing crossing maintenance 
work, how can Southern earnestly contend that UTA, and not Southern, had the duty 
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to maintain the crossing? 
The Court may wish to consider, as it analyzes Southern's contention that it was 
not a railway company and not a railroad company, the various statutes included in 
Title 56 (entitled "Railroads") of the Utah Code. For example, does §56-2-2, which 
makes it unlawful for any railroad corporation or company "operating or in control of 
the operation of any railroad" to haul defective rolling stock, not apply to Southern? 
And consider §56-1-18.5, which insulates owners and operators of railroads against 
certain kinds of claims. Would Southern hesitate to seek the protection of that statute? 
No case that has come to the attention of the Goebels' counsel or, apparently, 
Southern's counsel, supports the position advanced by Southern. A Utah case, Oregon 
Short Line R. Co. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co.. 237 P.2d 829, 830 (Utah 1951), 
suggests a connection between an entity that operates a railroad and that entity's status 
as a carrier (i.e., one that, like Southern, moves people and/or things, even if it does 
not own the land over which those people and things are moved). It is also of note that 
the concurring opinion, id. at 831, referring to a part of the Utah Constitution, Art. XII, 
§12, that has since been amended, notes that"... Utah has declared that all railroad 
companies are common carriers that are required to receive and transport passengers 
and freight." 
In Stroble v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 31 N.W. 63, 66 (Iowa 1886), the 
court observed: 
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What is the use and operation of a railway? It is constructed for the sole 
purpose of the movement of trains. That is its sole use. What is the operation 
of a railway? They can be operated in no other way than by the movement of 
trains. 
This judicial pronouncement makes considerably more sense than Southern's strained 
and unsupported contention, made in its Brief at 37, that "operate" means "control 
access to." And, in any event, there was no evidence presented at trial that UTA was 
"controlling access to" the crossing. Southern was, in the language of Utah Code Ann. 
§10-7-26(1) and contrary to Southern's contention, the entity that was, and had been, 
exclusively, for more than four years, "operating" the subject railway tracks. Also, for 
purposes of the Salt Lake City Ordinance, "their tracks" means, in the circumstances, 
Southern's tracks, because Southern held the Easement; and Southern is the one, and 
the only one, that had been "operating." And, for purposes of Utah Code Ann. §56-1-
11, "its road" means, for the same reason, Southern's road. 
Additionally, and importantly, Southern pursuant to the Easement had and 
exercised the right to occupy the land.14 With that interest in the land it was the 
functional equivalent, for purposes of the statutes and ordinance, of the "owner" of the 
property. Southern states, at p. 37: 
14
 UTA, having acquired the land from Union Pacific at the same time that the 
Easement and the Agreement were executed, held what easement law considers to be 
the "servient estate," while Southern, as the easement holder, held the "dominant 
estate." For a discussion of the proposition that it is the holder of the dominant estate 
rather than the holder of the servient estate that owes a duty of care to the public, see 
Suterav.GoJokir.Inc, 86 F.3d 298, 301-02 (2nd Cir. 1996). 
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It only makes sense that inasmuch as these provisions pertain to real property, 
that the owners or those who control the use of the property (lessees) should 
have the obligations concerning what is done with the property. 
What really makes sense is that Southern, under the Easement and the Agreement, and 
given what was really happening on the land, is the entity, or at least an entity,15 on 
which should be imposed the safety obligations concerning the property. 
The Court should rule that the District Court was correct in determining that 
Southern owed the Goebels duties of care under the statutes and the ordinance. 
B. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT SOUTHERN'S CONTENTION 
THAT IT COULD HAVE NO LEGAL DUTY TO MAKE AND 
KEEP THE CROSSING REASONABLY SAFE WITH RESPECT 
TO BICYCLE TRAVEL. 
Southern contends that it could have no legal duty to make the crossing surface 
so smooth that there would be no gap wide enough to accommodate any bicycle tire. 
In making that contention, Southern is in essence ignoring the reality that many 
thousands of people in the Salt Lake Valley regularly use bicycles for commuting, and 
exercising, and recreational purposes, and that among their number are those who 
traverse railroad crossings. It also ignores the proposition that a 3A" wide gap can be as 
dangerous to a bicyclist as a 3" hole can be to a pedestrian or as a 10" hole can be to a 
15
 In the District Court proceedings, Southern contended that UTA had the sole safety 
responsibility, and UTA contended that it was all Southern's responsibility. The 
Goebels contended that both of those entities were responsible. If the Court now 
determines that only Southern had the obligation, it will not be necessary for the jury 
in the new trial to determine UTA's fault or percentage of causal fault, or to consider 
the nuances of the Administration and Coordination Agreement. 
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motorist. Dan Bergenthal, a Salt Lake City transportation engineer, testified with 
respect to the importance of bicycle riding and the importance of safety of bicyclists. 
R. 6763, Tr. 325-28. 
The Goebels acknowledge that Southern did not have the duty to make and 
keep the crossing surface and its environs (including the area where the protuberance 
existed) in absolutely safe condition. But Southern had the duty to keep things 
reasonably safe or, in the words of, for example, Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11, reasonably 
"good and sufficient" for the safety of the traveling public. Whether Southern 
discharged that duty is a quintessential jury question. 
The cases from other jurisdictions cited by Southern are unavailing. Southern 
does not bring to the Court's attention Utah law on the subject. In Shugren v. Salt 
Lake City, 159 P. 530 (Utah 1916), this Court, in the course of analyzing the "trivial 
defect" rule advanced by Southern, observed: 
While there is much force to the contention that to hold a municipality liable for 
a defect in the outlying residence districts, such as the one in question here, 
where the municipality must of necessity maintain hundreds of miles of walks, 
is enforcing a rather strict rule of liability against the municipality, yet, in our 
judgment, such a rule in the long run is fair and more logical than is the one 
adopted by some of the courts, whereby it is attempted to determine as a matter 
of law that a defect of two, or one of two and one-half inches, or even more, 
does not constitute such a defect as will make the municipality liable for 
injuries sustained by persons falling over it. In all such cases courts are 
compelled to adopt and enforce an arbitrary rule applicable to all cases, while if 
the question is treated as one of fact, a jury of fair, practical men may determine 
each case upon its own peculiar features or facts and circumstances. 
Id. at 533. 
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Cases construing Shugren have reached the same conclusion. In Ray v. Salt 
Lake City, 69 P.2d 256, 257 (Utah 1937), this Court (acknowledging, as it did in 
Shugren, that rare cases may warrant the taking of a sidewalk defect case from a jury) 
stated: 
In the very nature of the situation it must be obvious that the courts ought not 
and cannot arbitrarily determine that the maintenance of a particular defect in a 
street or sidewalk does or does not constitute neglect. 
And, in Taylor v. Ogden City, 214 P. 311, 312 (Utah 1923), a crosswalk defect case, 
this Court, citing Shugren, ruled that: 
Whether the defect was dangerous or otherwise, or whether the street or 
crosswalk was reasonably safe for travel or not, or whether the appellant had 
exercised that degree of care required by the law as charged by the court, was 
for the jury. 
As explained in cases such as Raper v. Wilmington W. R. Co., 36 S.E. 115, 115-16 
(N.C. 1900), and Wabash R. Co. v. DeHart 65 N.E. 192, 194-95 (Ind. App. 1902), 
railroad crossings by their nature interfere with public highways and streets, and the 
law for that reason mandates that railroad companies make and keep crossings 
reasonably safe. Shugren and its progeny deal with the duties of municipalities with 
respect to sidewalks and streets. The Court should perhaps be even less inclined in 
this case than it was in those cases to rule, as a matter of law, that the subject defect 
was so insignificant that the Goebels are not entitled to present their case to a jury. 
Nor is the matter of supposed great expense to Southern of particular concern. 
First, there is evidence that gaps wide enough to be dangerous can simply be filled (R. 
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6065-70; 6109). Conspicuous warning signs can also be utilized. If reasonably 
necessary, in the interest of public safety, crossing pads can be removed and 
reinstalled. R. 6065-68; 6209. Further, with respect to Southern's contention about 
the supposed expense (there was, in any event, no evidence regarding that 
proposition), the Court may wish to consider Walden v. State of Montana, 818 P.2d 
1190, 1194 (Mont. 1991), a case in which a bicyclist sustained a serious head injury 
when the tires of his bike slipped into a longitudinal seam in a highway. There the 
Montana Supreme Court approved the giving of a jury instruction that made it clear 
that lack of funds or an inadequate number of employees was not a factor in the State's 
duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condition. 
Mr. Goebel is suffering, living proof of the significance of the defect in 
question, and it is unfair for Southern to contend that that defect was "trivial." 
Southern makes the remarkable argument, at p. 39, that "[a]s a matter of public 
policy, the burden of preventing accidents from small gaps in seams at railroad 
crossings should be placed on bicyclists where it most reasonably belongs." Southern 
would apparently have the Court accept the proposition that a bicyclist who is utterly 
without fault, as may have been the case with Mr. Goebel, and who encounters a gap 
that he is not even able to see without nearly stopping and inspecting (that was 
Southern's job), should be unable to recover, in any circumstances, if his bike tire 
should travel into a gap and he should consequently sustain a catastrophic injury. 
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Such a result would not only seem to be grossly unfair to bicyclists but also to give 
railroad companies a free pass and to encourage them to ignore the danger that their 
lack of care can cause. How could that result be good law or good public policy? 
C. CONTRARY TO SOUTHERN'S ARGUMENT, THE SUBJECT 
INCIDENT WAS, AS A MATTER OF TRIABLE FACT, 
REASONABLY FORESEEABLE. 
Reasonable foreseeability is a quintessential jury question. That no witness 
who testified in this case had heard of another railroad crossing surface gap-related 
bicycle accident should not end the inquiry. As noted above, Chuck Collins testified 
that he was aware of other analogous accidents. So did David Ingebretsen. R. 6766, 
Tr. 875. Also, it will never be known what mishaps, or near mishaps, other bicyclists 
have had while traversing and attempting to traverse crossings, including but not 
limited to the subject crossing. For example, a lucky person might have encountered 
such a gap and not been injured or not seriously injured or may have been injured but 
not have made a claim. Perhaps more importantly, Omni's Mr. Nutting testified that 
this kind of an incident was foreseeable. R.6065-70; 6104-05. And Southern's 
Mr. Jackson acknowledged that he knew it could happen. R. 6765, Tr. 623. Perhaps 
most importantly, this Court has laid down the law, in Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 
723, 728 (Utah 1985), a case not brought to the Court's attention by Southern, that the 
mere fact that a particular kind of accident has not happened before does not make it, 
as a matter of law, unforeseeable. 
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The picture of Southern as one grasping at straws in this Appeal is perhaps best 
exemplified by the following sentence, which appears at pp. 40-41 of Southern's Brief: 
A ruling that [Southern] had a duty to remedy the alleged gap in the subject 
crossing also would require a finding that [Southern] should have foreseen that 
Mr. Goebel would ignore his obligation to exercise care for his own safety. 
First, it is far from a foregone conclusion that Mr. Goebel was at all negligent. 
Second, the Court's acceptance of this argument would be tantamount to the Court's 
accepting a defendant's argument, in a vehicular collision case, that a plaintiffs fault, 
however slight in percentage, renders a defendant ipso facto non-liable. The law 
simply does not work that way. 
D. CONTRARY TO SOUTHERN'S REMARKABLE CONTENTION, 
THERE WAS DIRECT EVIDENCE, AND EVIDENCE FROM 
WHICH A REASONABLE JURY COULD INFER, THAT THE 
GAP WAS THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT. 
Southern continues, at p. 42, to rely on the measurements that were taken of the 
subject gap in the middle of the summer. The man, David Stephens, who took the 
measurements, candidly acknowledged that he does not know what they would have 
been in February. R. 6767, Tr. 1185. As noted above, every witness who discussed 
the question agreed that gaps are wider in the wintertime than in the summertime, as a 
function of the change in temperature. The measurements taken by Mr. Ertel (Ex. P-
13; R. 6762, Tr. 180) support the proposition that the gap was wide enough on the day 
of the incident. He was not, contrary to Southern's contention, measuring only the 
"ends" of the gap. And the gap does not appear to have been "hourglass"-shaped at 
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the time of the incident. E.g., R. 6766, Tr. 821; Ex. P-10. Observations made by 
Mr. Ertel (R. 6762, Tr. 180-81) support the proposition that it was deep enough. 
Southern's statement that "gaps most often are filled with debris" is a misstatement. 
Mr. Ingebretsen testified (R. 6765, Tr. 770-71) that, in his trips around the Salt Lake 
Valley looking generally at gaps debris situations, he encountered the whole gamut, 
some that were completely filled, some that were completely empty, and some that 
were in between. Southern is reaching, especially given the lack of any other plausible 
explanation for the incident, when it asks the Court to speculate that the subject gap 
could have become dangerous only after the incident or filled with debris at the time of 
the incident.16 
Southern makes a bold statement at p. 43, under heading E: "There Was No 
Evidence To Prove That The Alleged Gap, Assuming It Existed, Was The Cause Of 
Mr. GoebePs Accident." That statement is made in the face of direct evidence on that 
point. Mr. Ingebretsen, who carefully analyzed the situation and who thoroughly 
considered all possible explanations, ruled out everything but the gap in question. 
Dr. Woolley, Southern's expert, offered a different explanation (that Mr. Goebel went 
off to the right of the road and struck an exposed rail or a curb face at the far end of the 
16
 Southern erroneously contends that Mr. Ingebretsen "testified that the wheel had to 
travel the full 21" length of the one-eight gap ... to be able to fall far enough to make 
the impact with the rail significant." See R. 6766, Tr. 867-74; 927-47; 969-75; and R. 
6767, Tr. 1100-05, for Mr. Ingebretsen's testimony regarding the wheel-descent 
dynamics. 
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crossing). Dr. Woolley's explanation makes no sense, given not only 
Mr. Ingebretsen's explanation but also such things as where Mr. Goebel ended up (see 
the X on Ex. P-9 (smaller copy included in the Addendum hereto, at 022), and see the 
testimony from the paramedic, Jeffrey Clark (R. 6763, Tr. 225)). Both Mr. Roberts 
(R. 6762, Tr. 160) and Mr. Clark (R. 6763, Tr. 227) testified that the picture of 
Mr. Goebel's having been riding way over to the right (north) of the crossing surface 
made no sense. And Mr. GoebePs own account (of going to the left of the 
protuberance) also rules that out. Dr. Woolley's only other suggestion was the 
thoroughly speculative one that there was some phantom object in the roadway that 
disappeared before anybody could see it. Mr. Roberts looked for such an object but 
did not see one. R. 6762, Tr. 140-41. Nor did Mr. Clark. R. 6763, Tr. 233. And there 
was, as a matter of reasonable jury inference,17 based on all the evidence, no plausible 
explanation for the incident other than that given by Mr. Ingebretsen. Southern's 
contention that there was no evidence to support the gap scenario is not only 
remarkable. It may be an indication of the overall weakness of Southern's position in 
this litigation. Southern appears to be firing indiscriminate arrows, hoping that one 
will somehow pierce the heart of the Goebels' case and cause the Goebels again to be 
denied their long-sought and once nearly attained jury decision. This Court should not 
17
 See the jury instruction (R. 5891) agreed upon by the Goebels and Southern, 
regarding circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences. 
38 
allow Southern to succeed in its effort to continue to frustrate the Goebels' quest for 
justice. 
III. THE CITY HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY COUNTERED, BECAUSE IT 
CANNOT, THE GOEBELS9 CONTENTION THAT MR. GOEBEL IS 
ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
A RULING THAT HE CAN PROCEED TO TRIAL AGAINST THE 
CITY. 
A. THIS IS NOT A "STRICT COMPLIANCE'9 CASE. 
The City makes much, in its Brief, of the concept of "strict compliance" with 
the Governmental Immunity Act. The Goebels understand the significance of "strict 
compliance." Even though the City unquestionably had timely notice of Mr. Goebel's 
claim, denied the claim less than a month after it was submitted, and litigated the case 
for three years before attempting to have Mr. Goebel's claim dismissed for supposed 
failure to comply with the recipient-of-notice provision of the Act, the Goebels 
acknowledge that Mr. Goebel was not in compliance if the Court determines that the 
1998 amendments should be retroactively applied. The Court need not, in other 
words, even consider the notion that this is yet another attempt by a plaintiff to avoid 
the "strict compliance" rule. Mr. Goebel did "strictly comply" with the law that 
should govern this dispute: the law that was in effect at the time his claim arose. 
B. THE COURT SHOULD, TO BE CONSISTENT WITH PRIOR 
CASE LAW, DETERMINE THAT THE STATUTORY CHANGES 
WERE "SUBSTANTIVE" AND REVERSE THE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
The City erroneously contends that Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165 (Utah 
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1988), is inapposite. It makes that contention on the supposed basis that the post-
incident statutory change in Schultz "imposed a statute of limitations for certain claims 
where, prior to the change, there was none." Clearly, there was some statute of 
limitations that governed Ms. Schultz's claim. The real question was whether she had 
to file a pre-suit notice of claim as a prerequisite to her filing suit. It could certainly be 
argued, contrary to the City's contention, that the entire thrust of the statutory change 
in Schultz was "procedural" - i.e., that it required a claimant, after the change went 
into effect, to go through the "procedure" of a pre-suit claim, whereas, prior to that 
statutory change, a claimant needed to follow no such "procedure" - and that the 
subject 1998 changes simply fine-tuned that "procedure." Yet this Court appears in 
Schultz to have treated the statutory amendment there at issue to be "substantive" and 
expressly mentioned the status of the law as of the time "the claim arose." The Court 
should rule that the subject statutory changes were just as "substantive" as that 
mentioned in Schultz, determine that those changes should not be retroactively 
applied, and, accordingly, reverse the summary judgment. 
C. THE CITY'S MECHANICAL "PROCEDURAL" VS. 
"SUBSTANTIVE" ARGUMENT SHOULD BE REJECTED. 
The City, failing to respond to the subject matter jurisdiction part of the 
It was (see paragraph 7 of the District Court's Conclusions of Law, set forth at page 
2 of the Addendum to the City's Brief; and see the first sentence of the Conclusion of 
the City's Brief) on the basis of supposed lack of subject matter jurisdiction that the 
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Goebels' analysis, urges the Court to accept the mechanical argument that, (1) because 
the statutory changes in question simply made clear who, in City government, is to be 
the recipient of a notice of claim, the change is purely procedural, and (2) because 
other decisions of this Court have held that purely procedural changes may be applied 
retroactively, the District Court was correct in ruling that the subject changes should 
be applied retroactively and in granting summary judgment. 
In none of the cases in which this Court has held that purely procedural changes 
may be applied retroactively is there even a discussion of subject matter jurisdiction. 
It can fairly be said that in those cases (e.g., Evans & Southerland Computer Corp. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997); Pilcher v. Department of Soc. 
Serv., 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983)) the changes were not only purely procedural but also 
merely procedural. In no Utah case has it been determined that a change in the law 
that could divest a court of subject matter jurisdiction should be applied retroactively. 
Yet that is what this Court's affirmance of the summary judgment would mean. 
Another hypothetical situation for the Court to consider, in addition to that 
suggested in the Goebels' Opening Brief at 47, is the following: in 1996, another 
person is injured; that person, with an unquestionably valid claim, files, within a year 
of the date of her injury, her notice of claim with an unquestionably appropriate 
District Court granted the City's motion for summary dismissal of Mr. Goebel's 
claims. 
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representative of the "governing body of the political subdivision" in question; her 
claim is denied; she files her lawsuit in timely fashion; the case is litigated toward trial 
or settlement; and then, come May 4, 1998, the law is changed to require service of the 
notice on a representative of the political subdivision different from the one she 
served. If that change is applied retroactively to the date of her injury, her claim, 
through no even arguable fault of her or her legal counsel, will have evaporated. 
Because of the fundamental jurisprudential significance of subject matter jurisdiction, 
and because the subject matter jurisdiction defense can be raised at any time, that is the 
result that affirmance of the summary judgment would mandate. 
The City cites Hall v. Utah State Dept, of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, in support 
of its contention that the Goebels' concern about where affirmance of the summary 
judgment could lead is illusory.19 Footnote 1 of Hall states: 
Changes to two sections of the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act 
became effective on May 3, 1999, after entry of the trial court's final order. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§67-21-4 & 5 (Supp. 1999). The changes are not relevant to 
the issues before us. 
The City would apparently have the Court conclude that what it by that footnote 
intended to say was that the changes there in question were not relevant because they 
19
 The City's suggestion that this Court would not condone "such an unreasonable 
proposal or result" is interesting. For the City is itself advancing in this litigation a 
contention that relies, given the City's actual notice of the claim, denial of the claim, 
and lengthy litigation of the claim, on a very technical proposition, one that in a sense 
has nothing much to do with "reason." 
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were made after entry of the trial court's final order. The Court could just as well have 
been saying that the changes were not relevant because they did not conceptually deal 
with any of the issues there before the Court. Also, there is no reason to think that the 
statutory sections of Tile 67 of the Utah Code there referenced raised any subject 
matter jurisdiction concerns. 
Footnote 2 of Hall states: 
Subsequent to Hall's institution of his suit in court, the legislature adopted a 
number of amendments to the Governmental Immunity Act, including two 
changes to the state statute's notice of claim provision, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-
12. These changes are immaterial to our analysis in the case at hand and thus 
do not affect the result. 
(Emphasis added.) Again, the City apparently wishes the Court to conclude that what 
that footnote intended to convey was that because the changes in question (similar to 
the ones that are at issue in this case) were made after Mr. Hall's suit was instituted, 
they had no significance to the Court's analysis. A more careful reading of the 
footnote, focusing on the word "immaterial" in the footnote's last sentence, should 
cause the Court to reject the City's contention with respect to the supposed 
significance of that footnote. The reason that the changes mentioned by the Court in 
footnote 2 were immaterial to the analysis is, apparently, that the problem with 
Mr. Hall's notice of claim was not that he arguably served the wrong governmental 
entity representative but that (24 P.3d at 966) he filed his notice of claim at the same 
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time that he filed suit, rather than delaying filing of suit for the period mandated by 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-14. 
Suffice it to say that if the Court intended by the footnotes in Hall to say what 
the City suggests, that would create a substantial inconsistency in Utah law, given the 
established principle that the subject matter jurisdiction defense can be raised at any 
time. 
The City misses the mark, regarding the hypothetical scenario presented by the 
Goebels in their Opening Brief at 47, when i1 protests that 
those facts are not present in this matter since the Goebels were clearly not in 
compliance with the Notice of Claim provision of the Governmental Immunity 
Act at the time they filed their notice and they did not obtain a judgment against 
the City that, as a result of the 1998 amendment, was taken away from them. 
City's Brief at 12. When this Court decides cases, it establishes the law that will 
govern future disputes. The point of the example used by the Goebels in their Opening 
Brief is, like the one used hereinabove, to show where the Court's ruling will lead if it 
ignores the subject matter jurisdiction aspects of this case and affirms the summary 
judgment. 
The City does not dispute the proposition that the Court's hands are not tied by 
any Utah statute or by any of its previous decisions. Pursuant to Schultz and/or in 
light of subject matter jurisdiction considerations, the Court should rule that the 
subject statutory changes are not applicable to Mr. Goebel's claim and reverse the 
summary judgment. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing points and authorities and those set forth in their 
Opening Brief, the Goebels urge the Court to reverse the District Court's rulings in 
question and to remand with fitting directives, including that the Goebels shall be 
allowed to present their claims against both Southern and the City to a new jury. 
Respectfully submitted this / > day of October, 2003. 
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ADDENDUM 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
SANDY FRANGER 
The Salt Lake City Southern 
Railroad Co. , Inc. 
C/O RaiilTex 
404 0 Broadway, Suite 200 
San Antonio, Texas 78209 
PERMANENT FREIGHT RAILROAD OPERATING EASEMENT 
FREIGHT RAILROAD OPERATING EASEMENT i lfFreight Easement") 
granted as of March 31, 1993, by the UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation (hereinafter referred to as "UPRR") 
to THE SALT LAKE CITY SOUTHERN RAILROAD CO-, INC., a Texas 
corporation (hereinafter "SLS") . 
WHEREAS, pursuant to that certain Assignment:, Assumption and 
Indemnity Agreement between UPRR, as Assignor, and SLS, as 
Assignee, dated as of March 31, 1993 (the "Assignment 
Agreement") , UPRR has assigned and conveyed to SLS assets 
necessary for certain freight railroad operations on certain 
railroad line generally referred to as UPSR's Provo Subdivision 
Line and Lovendahl Spur (which Is more specifically described 
below and referred to herein is the "Right-of-way") ; 
rrvHEREAS, UPRR and Utah Transit Authority (hereinafter "UTA") 
have heretofore entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement dated 
as of October 30, 1992, covering UPRR's sale to UTA of the Right-
of-way described in Section 1,1 hereof; 
WHEREAS, pursuant to the terms of the aforesaid Purchase 
Agreement UPRR's deed to UTA conveying the Right-of-way to UTA, 
fij PLAINTIFFS 
UPRR r e s e r v e d unto i t s e l f a Reta ined F r e i g h t O p e r a t i n g Easement 
o v e r t h e R i g h t - o f - W a y d e s c r i b e d i n S e c t i o n 1 . 1 h e r e o f . 
WHEREAS, pursuant t o t h e terms o f t h e P u r c h a s e Agreement 
b e t w e e n UPRR and UTA, UPRR has agreed t o g r a n t t o SLS a f r e i g h t 
r a i l r o a d o p e r a t i n g easement on t h e R i g h t - o f - w a y , i n order t o 
e n a b l e SLS t o p r o v i d e common c a r r i e r r a i l f r e i g h t s e r v i c e on t h e 
R i g h t - o f - W a y . 
NOW, THEREFORE, i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e p r e m i s e s , 
r e s e r v a t i o n s , covenants and under tak ings c o n t a i n e d i n t h e 
P u r c h a s e Agreement , UPRR hereby g r a n t s t h e f o l l o w i n g easement t o 
SLS: 
1- GRANT OF FREIGHT EASEMENT 
1 . 1 S u b j e c t t o t h e terms and c o n d i t i o n s h e r e o f , UPRR h e r e b y 
g r a n t s t o SLS a r a i l f r e i g h t easement f o r t h e p u r p o s e of 
p r o v i d i n g common c a r r i e r r a i l f r e i g h r s e r v i c e t o a l l f r e i g h t 
c u s t o m e r s on t h e f o l l o w i n g R i g h t - o f - w a y : 
UP f s freight railroad line located between Ninth Street 
Junction, on the north side of NINTH (900) SOUTH 
STREET, Salt Lake City, Utah (approximately milepost 
798.74) and the Salt Lake County/Utah County boundary 
l i n e (approximately milepost 775.19) consisting of 
approximately 23.55 miles, as shown on the UP's Chief 
Engineer's Alignment Maps of the Union Pacific Provo 
Subdivision Line and as shown on the Oregon Short line 
Railroad Station Maps - Lands aka Property Accounting 
Valuation Maps; 
UPf s spur freight railroad line which departs in a 
southwesterly direction from the Provo Subdivision Line 
at approximately 6400 South in Murray, Utah 
(approximately milepost 790.52) crossing under both the 
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1-15 freeway and the D&JRGW Railroad main line, and then 
heading south to approximately 7400 South, to the point 
of intersection with the DSRGW right of way 
(approximately milepost 1.402), a dis-tance of about 1,4 
miles, as shown on the DP's Chief Engineer's Alignment 
Maps of the Union Pacific Provo Subdivision Line and as 
shown on the Oregon Shortline Railroad Station Maps -
Lands a3ca Property Accounting Valuation Maps. 
Ttiat portion of the Property sold by Seller to UTA located 
in the center of historic Sandy (Old Town) whicht extends 
from approximately 8600 South to 9000 South along the DPRR 
RigJht-Of-Way and running from approximately ISO East to 19o 
East; the east-west width of this property is approximately 
260 feet, more or less, with the exception of a* small 
portion on the north end which is narrower, and its length 
from north to south is approximately 2.560 feet; 
That portion of the Property sold by Seller to UTA situated 
between 5410 and 533 0 South Streets at 3 00 West and which is 
approximately 2500 feet "long and 125 feet wide; 
BDT LESS AND EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE PARCELS OF PROPERTY 
DESCRIBED IN EXHIBIT "A" HERETO AS TO WHICH NO FREIGHT 
EASEMENT WAS RESERVED AND AS TO WHICH NO EASEMENT IS GRANTED 
HEREBY 
3 2 Th i s Fr eigh t: Easement is for common ca rrier rail 
freight service on the Right-of-way. The Freight Easement shall 
grant SLS the exclusive right * conduct freight railroad 
operatmn . on thti kighl •ui•w. ., u! i*h<i J ! nut be construed to 
prohibit cr limit non-freight uses by other parties, which shall 
not unreasonably interfere with SLSfs permitted use. Said 
easemen t includes the right to operate with SLS's trains, 
locomotives, rail cars and rai 1 equipment with SLS's own crews 
over the Right-of-Way for t he pu rposes thp s*?f: fort* " • th i 
Freight Easement; provided, however, that said right ooerate 
trains, locomotives, rail cars and rail equipment over the Right-
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of-Way s h a l l be an exclusive right to the occupancy and use of 
the Right-of-Way only with respect to r a i l freight operations and 
SLS acknowledges and agrees that Utah Transit Authority ("DTA") 
or i t s des ignee sha l l have the right to the occupancy and a l l 
other uses of the Right-of-Way. 
1.3 The conveyance of th i s Freight Easement by UPRR to SLS 
inc ludes any and a l l r ights and obligations of UPRR under federal 
law t o conduct common carrier ra i l freight service . 
1.4 This Freight Easement granted by UPRR in the Right-of-
Way inc ludes a r ight of entry over the Right-of-Way for any and 
a l l SLS employees, agents or representatives, machinery, v e h i c l e s 
or equipment which SLS reasonably may deem necessary or 
convenient for the purposes of inspecting the Right-of-Way, 
d e s i r i n g any derailments or wrecks of SLS trains on the Right-of-
Way or otherwise conducting SLS r a i l fre ight service over the 
Right-of-Way in accordance with th i s Freight Easement. 
1.5 This Freight Easement i s subject t o the terms, 
condi t ions and l imitat ions of the separate Administration and 
Coordination Agreement between SLS and UTA and also the fol lowing 
terms and condi t ions: 
At any time after the f i f th anniversary of the c l o s i n g 
of UPRR's s a l e to UTA, UPRR has the r ight , upon t h i r t y 
(3 0) days advance written notice, to repurchase the 
Fre ight Easement described herein, or to designate a 
t h i r d party to purchase the Freight Easement described 
h e r e i n , for the amount of $5,000 payable to SLS. 
S i m i l a r l y , a f ter the f i f th anniversary of the c l o s i n g , 
SLS s h a l l have the right, after ninety (90) days 
advance written notice , to e lect to terminate i~ s 
operat ions under the Freight Easement, e i ther by 
abandonment/discontinuance of service , or through a 
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s a l e o f SLS's r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s under t h e F r e i g h t 
E a s e m e n t , prov ided however, t h a t such s a l e o r 
a b a n d o n m e n t / d i s c o n t i n u a n c e of SLS's o p e r a t i o n s under 
t h e F r e i g h t Easement s h a l l be s u b j e c t t o ICC a p p r o v a l . 
UPKR and any UPKR a s s i g n e e s h a l l u s e i t s / t h e i r b e s t 
e f f o r t s t o a s s i s t SLS i n l o c a t i n g a s u c c e s s o r 
r e a s o n a b l y a c c e p t a b l e t o UPRR or any UPRR a s s i g n e e , and 
i n s u p p o r t i n g any a p p l i c a t i o n o r p e t i t i o n f o r e x e m p t i o n 
f o r abandonment /d i s cont inuance of s e r v i c e . 
1 . 6 UPRR h a s t h e r i g h t t o a s s i g n i t s i n t e r e s t s i n t h i s 
F r e i g h t E a s e m e n t , i n c l u d i n g wi thout l i m i t a t i o n , t h e r i g h t s i n 
S e c t i o 
TERM AND TERMINATION 
T h i s F r e i g h t Easement s h a l l t e r m i n a t e and be e x t i n g u i s h e d 
and a 1,1 i: ea J p r o p e r t y r i g h t s g r a n t e d t o SLS her e u n d e i s h a l l v e s t 
i n t h e owner o f t h e Right-of-Way upon the . t e r m i n a t i o n , p u r s u a n t 
t o a n o r d e r o f t h e I n t e r s t a t e Commerce Commission ( Z . C . C . ) , o f 
common c a r r i e r r a i l f r e i g h t s e r v i c e on "the R i g h t - o f - W a y o r amy 
p a r t t h e r e o f ; p r o v i d e d , however, t h a t a t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h i s 
F r e i g h t E a s e m e n t p u r s u a n t t o such an o r d e r s h a l l a p p l y o n l y t o 
t h o s e s e c t i o n s o f t h e Right-of-Way s u b j e c t t o s u c h I . C . C . o r d e r . 
The t e r m i n a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s of ' t h i s S e c t i o n 2 -2 s h a l l n o t a p p l y t o 
a t-!r:rii ru-itii.ifi ui r\:i I 1 f r e i g h t s e r v i c e by SLG done a s p a r t of a 
t r a n s f e r o f i t s common c a r r i e r f r e i g h t r i g h t s a n d o b l i g a t i o n s t o 
a s u c c e s s o r o r a s s i g n . 
11 ;i WITNESS WHEREOF, t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o h a v e c a u s e d t h i s 
F r e i g h t Easement t o be e x e c u t e d as a s e a l e d i n s t r u m e n t a s of t h e 
d a t e f i r s t s e t f o r t h above by t h e i r d u l y a u t h o r i z e d 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . 
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A t t e s t : UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 
A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y T i t l e : &C&csr"<z s+5psr<+ ^ r 
A c k n o w l e d g e d : 
Th<^ S a l t LaJce C i t y Southern R a i l r o a d Co- , I n c . , 
<,C/-7Ul~* By: 
T i t l e : VJ^AJ l ^ ^ ^ ^ . 
STATE OF NEBRASKA ) 
) s s : 
COUNTY OF DOUGLAS ) 
On the O 0 day of March, 1993, personally appeared before 
me <^ > cu. SStYt-9'** and A. A S CAfz>«^ 7" J. 
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, 
the said c* w- S^Yc^^s is the Assistant 
Secretary of Union Pacific Railroad Company, and that he, the 
said /*\ ^  xc^b^z. T2- is the ^ ^ $-T?r r~* £' VS<3 
of Union Pacific Railroad Company, and that the within and 
foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by 
authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors and said 
<£, ut. J>y^^-f
 and X- /£ £c/j-vw<s r 2- e a c h 
duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same 
and that the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation -A GOTERAL MJLWY-Sfclf of fetasb 
p | HUTHA.HOWfcflD 
«5Jg^» My f Ccmra. Exo. Nov. 5 ,1955 y> ^/LJr^-^JP 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
r e s / / / <**/ *? £> . M y r e s i d e n c e i s 
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STATE (JF UTAH ) 
) SS: COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the /£7_ day of Osy<dl^ 1993, personally appeared 
before me David P. Valentine who being by me duly sworn did say 
that he is the Vice-President of The Salt Lake City Southern 
Railroad Co., Inc., and that the within and foregoing instrument 
was signed in behalf of The Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Co., 
Inc. by authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors and*' 
said David P. Valentine duly acknowledged to me that The Salt 
Lake City Southern Railroad Co., Inc. .Executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
*3%fri?JW& ftft¥/S''mS • *««"•»« i S 
'Astp 
WILLIAM 6. OSWALD 1 
S7W*Kt2CGSarfi#5G0 1 
Se*L*te CftJMti S41Ct I 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
DESCRIPTION OF TRACKAGE SUBJECT TO SLSfS FREIGHT EASEMENT 
UP's freight railroad line located between Ninth Street 
Junction, on the north side of NINTH (900) SOOTH STREET, 
Salt Lake City, Utah (approximately milepost 798.74) and 
tiie Salt Lake Coxxnty/TJ-tah County boundary line 
(approximately milepost 775 . 19) consisting of 
approximately 23.55 miles, as shown on the UPfs Chief 
Engineer's Alignment Maps of the Union Pacific Provo 
Subdivision Line and as shown on the Oregon Shortline 
Railroad Station Maps - Lands aka Property Accounting 
Valuation Maps; 
UP' s spur freight railroad line which departs in a 
southwesterly direction from the Provo Subdivision Line 
at approximately 6400 South in Murray, Utah 
(approximately milepost 790.52) crossing under both the 
1-15 freeway and the D&RGW Railroad main line, and then 
heading south to approximately 7400 South, to the point 
of intersection with the D&RGW right of way 
(approximately milepost 1.402), a distance of about 1.4 
miles, as shown on the UPfs Chief Engineer's Alignment 
Maps of the Union Pacific Provo Subdivision Line and as 
shown on the Oregon Shortline Railroad Station Maps -
Lands aka Property Accounting Valuation Maps; 
The trackage on that portion of the Property sold by Seller to 
UTA located in the center of historic Sandy (Old Town) which 
extends from approximately 8600 South to 9000 South along the 
UPRR Right-Of-Way and running from approximately 150 East to 
190 East; the east-west width of this property is 
approximately 260 feet, more or less, with the exception of a 
small portion on the north end which is narrower-, and its 
length from north to south is approximately 2560 feet; 
The trackage on that portion of the Property sold by Seller to 
UTA situated between 5410 and 5830 South Streets, at 300 West 
and which is approximately 2500 feet long and 125 feet wide. 
BUT LESS AND EXCEPTING THEREFROM TEE FOLLOWXNG DESCRIBED 
PARCELS OF PROPERTY WHICH ARE NOT INCLUDED IN OR SUBJECT TO 
T^iZ FREIGHT RAILROAD OPERATING EASEMENT: 
SEE THE DESCRIPTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES 
- 8 -
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(Exhibit "A" continued) 
a n Lace Me-1d1an, and mom fully described as follows, to-*it: 
fhTrS"3( l1, a S J 2 Z&ft**'**** S"" ter l l n e ° f " " ' a c t i on" 
M4 thirty urinrtas V a n I S ? ^ 1 H£» ?11 , '?a? : ? e n c a N o r t h n a d e9 r e a* 
- S £ 2 S T S ^ S S T f g ^ S t ^ 1 ? ' S S - &>?£& el hty-one 
hundredths fioiie) ££?? «? I S * ? """"dred one and fifteen 
si-y-eight hundredths (233.63) feet to the place of beginning?" 
R 1W P c ^ fnu ^ f e 2 t w i d e ' l n t h e N a r t h e ^ t 1/4 of Section 13,- T.2S 
nri*i:+ • J ^ - B a s e a n d Mer1*d1an» ^ n * ^ t of and adjacent to the 
h ^ n ^ r s h t J J * a y ?f t h e O r e g o n S h o r t U n e inroad Conic any. Said being more particularly described as follows: " j u rip 
?2S &?rt-2 J K ln» 18u4 f e S t j m ° r e °-r T e s s ' W e s t a n d 311 feet, mare or 
the l a ? rLSI X e Northeast^corner or said Section 13, said point faelna on 
the o S L r ? ? V?? 11"? °T, the ° r!g0n a o r t U n e i n road SO fest from 
2 2 4 2 ^ 5 il* °f 1 t s n i n l l n e ' *"<* a t toe Southwest corner of the 
nap*™*? J"e 'ttng and Refining Company's property; thence South a°30' W. 
S H 2 r f S S f f°*n B e r9 e r s l a n d ' 1 0 1 - 4 f e £ t ; thence March 0°30E., parallel 
f S - S d t i ^ f 8 f l E 0 ? , ^ C 8 n t e r l 1 n e ° f 0ra3°n Short-Une main I n , 1687 feet, thence South 33<J30W. 100.8 feet to the place of beginning. 
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(Exhibit "A:' continued) 
The following described land claim, to wit; Part of Lot three (3),and part 
of the Southeast quarter of the Northest quarter of Section Six (6) , in 
Township Three (3) South, of Range One (1) East, Salt Lake Meridian. 
Beginning eight 5/10 (8 5/10} rods East from the Northwest corner of said 
l o t thre— thence East nineteen 40/100 rods; thence South one hundred and 
s ixty (160) rods; thence West nineteen 40A00 rods; thence West one hundred 
and sixty (160) rods to the place of beginning. 
Less and excepting the followi-ng parcels of property, which are included wichii 
the Retained Fre ight Operating Easement: 
1. That portion within the bounds of the existing single 
line through track which is approximately 66 feet in width. 
2 That portion of the land lying between the single line 
through track and 14 feet East and abutting the cent P T line of ^  
the Easterly most track of the existing siding track sxtaatac xn 
Lets 40, 49, and 62, Sandy Station Plat-
0010 
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WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
Ken Ocken 
Union Pacific Railroad Company 
Law Department - Room 830 
1416 Dodge street 
Omaha, NE 68179 
DIVISION. 
TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT 
LIBRARY COPY 
TITLE. UPKR /\ ouS 
RETAINED FREIGHT OPERATING EASEMENT 
RETAINED FREIGHT OPERATING EASEMENT ( " F r e i g h t E a s e m e n t " ) 
r e t a i n e d by t h e Union P a c i f i c R a i l r o a d Company, a Utah 
c o r p o r a t i o n ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s "UP"). 
1
' RSSERVaTH-QN
 0 F FPT-TGHT EASEKFWf 
1 - 1 DP h e r e b y r e s e r v e s a r a i l f r e i g h t easement f o r t h e 
p u r p o s e o f p r o v i d i n g common c a r r i e r r a i l f r e i g h t s e r v i c e t o a l l 
f r e i g h t c u s t o m e r s on t h e Right-Of-Way (as d e f i n e d i n S e c t i o n 
l . l ( a ) o f t h e Purchase and S a l e Agreement be tween UP and Utah 
T r a n s i t A u t h o r i t y dated as of t h e 30 th day o f October , 1 9 S 2 ) . 
The r e a l p r o p e r t y t o which t h i s F r e i g h t Easement r e l a t e s i s 
d e s c r i b e d a s ; 
U P ' s f r e i g h t r a i l r o a d l i n e l o c a t e d b e t v e - r . »*«•*.* e+. 
7o« 5 j ( S a i t L a k e C i t y ' u t a i l ( a p p r o x i m a t e l y miTeno<rt-
™nk rl a n d ^ S a l t L a J c e C o^/Utah County^oSdSv 
u n e
 ( fFProxxmate ly m i l e o o s t 7 7 5 . 1 9 ) c o n s i s H n r ^ ^ 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2 3 . 5 5 m i l e s , a s s h o w n ' o S S S u£? f £ * . -
E n g i n e e r ' s Al ignment Macs o f t h e Union P a J , - S L J ? ^ 
S u b d i v i s i o n L ine and as" shown on S e Orlaon l n o 2 ? 7 ° 
XiSS^^STMaps"Lands •* ^ p ^ - c o ° ^ g e 
a z a p p r o x i m a t e d &Ann C^H-K <- Z..ZZ° ° f ^ i v i s i o n L ine 
onn 
heading south to approximately 7400 South, to the point 
of intersection with the D&RGW right of way 
(approximately milepost 1*402}, a distance of about 1.4 
miles, as shown on the DPfs Chief Engineerfs Alignment 
Maps of the Union Pacific Provo Subdivision Line and as 
shown on the Oregon Shortline Railroad Station Maps -
Lands a3ca Property Accounting Valuation Maps* 
That portion of the Property sold by Seller to UTA located 
in the center of historic Sandy (Old Town) which extends 
from approximately 8600 South to 9000 South along the DPRR 
Right-Of-Way and running from approximately 150 East to 190 
East; the east-west width of this property is approximately 
260 feet, more or less, with the exception of a" small 
portion on the north end which is narrower, and its length 
from north to south is approximately 2560 feet; 
That portion of the Property sold by Seller to UTA situated 
between 5410 and 5830 South Streets at 300 West and which is 
approximately 2500 feet long and 125 feet wide; 
BUT LESS AND EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE PARCELS OF PROPERTY 
DESCRIBED IN EXHIBIT lfAw HERETO AS TO WHICH NO FREIGHT 
EASEMENT IS RESERVED. 
1 • 2 This Freight Easement shall be for common carrier rail 
freight service on the Right-Of-Way and by this Freight Easement 
UP reserves the exclusive right to conduct freight railroad 
operations on the Right-Of-Way, but this Freight Easement shall 
not be construed to prohibit or limit other non-freight uses by 
other parties. Said easement includes the right to operate with 
UP's trains, locomotives, rail cars and rail equipment with UP's 
own crews over the Right-Of-Way for the purposes the set forth in 
tllls
 Freight Easement; provided, however, that said right to 
operate trains, locomotives, rail cars and rail equipment over 
the Right-Of-Way shall be an exclusive right to the occupancy and 
use cf the Right-Of-Way only with respect to rail freight 
operations and UP acknowledges and agrees that Utah Transit 
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;-. i or i^s designee sha l l have t h e r i g h t to t he 
occupancy and use of the Right-Of-Way for Passenger Operations 
and a l l o t h e r uses* 
eservat ion of t h i s Freight Easement by UP inc ludes 
a r e s e r v a t i o n •/:. any and a l l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s of UP under 
f e d e r a l ' . ijojinii-un c a r n - n i ai, 1 f r e i g h t s e rv i ce to 
f r e i g h t customers along the Right-Of-Way. 
1.4 The r e s e r v a t i o n of t h i s F r e i g h t E a s e m e n t i n c l u d e s 
r e s e r v a t i o n u ri ' jlit. nt, t'jit.ry over t h e R i g h t ~C3£ -Way f o r a n y and 
a l l UP e m p l o y e e s , a g e n t s o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , m a c h i n e r y , v e h i c l e s 
o r ' e q u i p m e n t w h i c h DP r e a s o n a b l y may deem n e c e s s a r y or c o n v e n i e n t 
f o r t h e p u r p o s e s of i n s p e c t i n g t h e R i g h t - O f - W a y , c l e a r i n g a n y 
d e r a i l m e n t s o r w r e c k s of DP t r a i n s on t h e R i g h t - O f - W a y o r 
o t h e r w i s e c o n d u c t i n g UP r a i l f r e i g h t service ove- ' \-::\* F i g h t - O f -
Wai :i i a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h i s F r e i g h t E a s e m e n t . 
1 . 5 T h i s F r e i g h t Easement i s s u b j e c t t o t h e t e r m s , 
c o n d i t i o n s and l i m i t a t i o n : i""1: forr.r in t.n*j Pu.rcha.se A g r e e m e n t 
b e t w e e n UTA and DP. 
2 . TERM MID
 T E R M I N A T I 0 N 
This F re igh t Easement s h a l l terminate and be ex t inguished 
and a l l r e a l property r i g h t s and other r i g h t s reserved to DP 
hereunder shai I vest in tlit- /junior o;: the Right-Of-Way in the 
event of t e rmina t ion , pursuant to an order of the I n t e r s t a t e 
Commerce Commission ( I .C.C.) f of common carrie"- r. . freight, 
s e r v i c e on "l",.l:je Right-Of-Way or any part, t he reo f ; provided, 
3 / 2 9 / 9 3 2asemnt3. ret, ' - 3 -
however, that a termination of this Freight Easement pursuant to 
such an order shall apply only to those sections of the Right-Of-
Way subject to such I.C.C. order. The termination provisions of 
this Section 2 shall not apply to a termination of rail freight 
service by UP done as part of a transfer of its common carrier 
freight rights and obligations to a successor or assign. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this 
Retained Freight Operating Easement to be executed as a sealed 
instrument by their duly authorized representatives as of the 
31st day of March, 1993. 
Attests 
(Print Name) 
Assistant Secretary 
Acknowledged: 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY: 
Ev 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 
Title 
/?. £. ji'CAd&fZ 
(Print Name) 
BQ^W^>^^ 
Joan Etamside 
President 
STATE OF NEBRASKA 
COUNTY OF DOUGLAS 
By. <£^c £S^ c_ 
John C.^^ingre* 
General Hanage2 
} SS: 
) 
On the 3 0 day of March, 1993, personally appeared before Q<- c<s~ £A-Vc<,^£ and *£. /*> ?c*4Z2<z r<l
 t me 
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, 
the said <Z. ^  S/*-V<~o ^ S is the Assistant 
Secretary of Union Pacific Railroad ComDany, and that he, the 
said ^. 4. J C ^ ^ 7 " 2 is the £-& A~?r: 7-0 St/stl 
of Union Pacific Railroad Company, and that the within and 
foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by 
authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors and said 
3/29/93 Easemnt3.ret - 4 -
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Cc U>- £f/<^<tf and . / . / Sc/u«<:r-2. each 
duly acknowl edged to me that said corporation executed the same 
and that the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation. 
My Commission Expires: ^ck^QcJC^ ^ / ^ - ^ - ~ ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
A eaew CTA3Y-toi K i 
HUfHA HOWAflO 
OwKL.Eso.ffat.5.1398 
STATE Or" UTAH 
) SS: 
COUNTS or- SALT LAKE ) 
On the /** day of £&&£*_ ^ -__ ./ 1993/ personally appeared 
before me Joan Burnside 4nd John C. Pingree who being by me duly 
sworn did say, each for herself /himself, that she, the said Joan 
Burnside is the President, and he, the said John C. Pingree is 
the General Manager of the Utah Transit Authority, and that the 
within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of Utah 
Transit Authority by authority of a resolution of its Board of 
Directors and said Joan Burnside and John C. Pingree each duly 
acknowledged to me that Utah Transit Authority executed the same 
and that the seal affixed is the seag/of Utah Transit Authority. 2 l x 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commissi*-n Expiree. 
yru^JL/'jr. /9?5-
^ Late City.Ush84lG1 J Uy Commas» E s i m I 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
w 5 o? ttedM^Sred £ 0 0 ) *?£<*' s l t » » ^ «« a>e Southwest 
~ . _Ter o r t J l e northeast quarter, and the Northwest <m*rt*r> n-f -MM *„„+»,„ ^ 
- N S S T ^ ? f S e c t 1 f l n ^ ^ (13). Township Two(1) SortT Lnce^L m ^ J^West, salt Lake Meridian, and more fully d'escrtbed a s ^ h o ^ s ? t o ^ f t : } 
S T h l ^ n 1 n g / ? t , a p o 1 n t o n t h e £"* a n d W e s t center line of said Section N, Thirteen (13), seven hundred forty-nine and one tenth (749 1? £ ? £ « * ^ 
rrfJS- - a f s a 1 d s e c t 1 o n fro" where i t 1s intersected by the center Tine 
main track ftS^i (IVJ^lSJl iSll* P a r a n e I "*tft said center line of himw—J^L?"*1 f 1 f t ? '50* f e s t distant therefrom at right ancles, six 
d m ^ ^ ^ t i ^ ^ T ^ ^ J 6 1 5 ^ f e f i t« t t o f a S fighty-one h S S S i . J ^ / n r 1 ? ^ ? * 8 8 (81*50,)East, one hundred one and fifteen 
( S ^ S t e S C - ? ^ *%2 t 5 6 n C a S 0 U t i 7 / ° d a g r e f i s a n d ttrtrty -motes 
f e - t ° t w U J ^ ^ E S ? 1 si**?*0 a n d seventy-three hundredths (862.73) 
£eex, thence North eighty-nine degrees and thirty minutes (89*30M Vest inp 
hundred (100) feet to a point fifty (50) feet E a s t ^ f ? c i a f o r e s a ? f center 
dl<L f B*™*™1* af the Oregon Short Line Railroad; thence North no 
degreesand thirty minufes (0-30*) East two hundred thirty-three and 
sixty-eight hundredths (233.68) fest to the place of beginning. 
' • t 
A strip of land 100 feet wide, in the } 
R.1W., Salt Lake Base and Meridian, lyi 
present right of way of the Oregon Shor fe/nt"' trip 
being more particularly described as fa « * » " 
r 
a an 
Beginning at a point 18S4 feety more or 
l ess . South of the Northeast comer of , „ .^ „ 
the East right of way line of the Orego p/fflu?'7 ora 
the center l ine of Its main l ine, and a ^ _. ^ 
American Smelting and Refining Company's property; thence South 0*30* W., 
parallel to said center line, 1691.8 feat; thenca North 81° E. along the 
South side of John Berger's land, 101.4 feet; thenca North 0C30E., parallel 
to and 150 feet from said center line of Oregon Short Line main line, 1637. 
feet; thence South 83°3(M. 100.8 feet to the place of becrinning. 
TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT 
LIBRARY COPY 
DIVISION 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
7. 
I ^ ™i>?£! n g / ?3* a p o 1 n t o n tte &«* *"<* "est center line of «*w c . ^ -
» * th ir ty j r f n u t e W l S ™ ^ W«f J*11,1?8?5 t h e n c a N a r t h n a Agrees 
main tracfc and f l f tv (SD\ f S f ^ S , ! 7 l 2 e W l l e l with said center line of 
hundred m t ^ l n ^ t w e ^ ^ angles , ^ 
degress and f i f t y minutes f f l - i w c l ^ i f2 u} ?*?• thence North eighty-one 
A i t n p o f land 100 feet wide, 1n the Northeast 1/4 of Section 13 T 2* 
^ r S e ^ n h ^ B a S e ? l«er1d1an, lying East of andTad|2ent £tLf~" 
S S S J B O S ^ ^ T f ? e ° ^ S S n ffl2rt"n6 Railroad Company. Said strip aeing more particularly described as follows: H
Beginning at a point 1854 feet , more or l e s s , West and 311 feet, more or 
t h e S E a ^ U M n £ ^ »»rthe«t corner of said Section L ,
 3 d .d pcin? b i tw on 
the c l S e r ? ? ! 0 ^ ^ M n e ° f , t h e O r ! g 0 n a o r t U n e Ra^™ad 50 feet f™ 
SerlS?Ll?Se °T ^ V ^ " " ? ' *"* ? tte Southwest comer of the 
parallel S ^ S S M S R e TJ a 1 , l 9 ,S? p ! 1 ? S P ^ e r t y ; thence South <T30' W., 
South c L ? J t d u C 8 2 t a r T 1 n e ' l f i 9 1 - a f e s t ; t h e n c s N o r t h 8 1 ° £- along the 
S and S L ^ S " Berger's land 101.4 feet; thence Norch 0«30E., parallel 
71 Jnc* J 5 0 f e e t from said canter Hne of Oreoon Short Line main Hn! TffS7 
fee t ; thence South 83«30W. 100.8 feet to the^lace 3 begn'nnfng. ' ^ 
DIVISION. 
TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT 
LIBRARY COPY 
T i p C Uf&& KO«V 
nni7 
(Exhibit "A1"' cont inued) 
L s •J vJ 
^ > £?? T h e following described land claim, to wit; Part of Lot three (3),and part 
aT* ^ * £ o f the Southeast quarter of the Northest quarter of Section Six (6"), in 
*> 2 OTP^T) Township Three (3) South, of Range One (1) East, Salt Lake Meridian. 
iX"?^C? Beginning eight 5/10 (8 5/10) rods East from the Northwest corner of said 
rr? j^« ?" 1°t three; thence East nineteen 40/100 rods; thence South one hundred and 
V k«» ** s ixty (160) rods; thence West nineteen 40/100 rods; thence West one hundre 
6 v 4 $ i v and sixty (160) rods to the place of beginning. 
<*'c 
Less and excepting the followi-ng parcels of property, which are included wit 
Che Retained Freight Operacing Easement: 
V 
^ ^ 1 . That port ion within the bounds of t h e e x i s t i n g s i n g l e 
^ - ^ l i n e through track which i s auuxayi-myrply 66 f e e t i n w id th ." 
P^^X 2 . That port ion of the land l y i n g between t h e s i n g l e l i n e 
,g-£hrough t r a c k and 14 f e e t East and abut t ing t h e c e n t e r l i n e of 
V ^"^e H a s t e r l y most trade cf the e x i s t i n g s i d i n g trac3c s i t u a t e d i n 
i ^ L c t s 4 0 , AS, and 62, Sandy S t a t i o n P l a t . 
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